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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is a pennissive appeal arising from two interlocutory orders entered by the district
court during Erick Hall's pending capital post-conviction proceedings.

This Court granted

Mr. Hall permission to appeal three issues: (1) whether the district court is justified in ordering a
second conflict inquiry where a conflict evaluation has already been conducted by an
independent attorney, who found no conflict, the Petitioner does not raise a conflict, and neither
the State nor the court can identify any facts that would give rise to a conflict; (2) whether the
district court violates the separation of powers by ordering the State Appellate Public Defender
(hereinafter SAPD) to pay for services already provided under the statute designating the

authority to provide conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD; and (3) whether an attorney-client
privilege exists during the representation of a client, when communications pertain to a pending
case on which the client is being represented by other attorneys.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Hall's Appellant's Brief. (Brief of Appellant, pp.1-4.) They need not be repeated in this
Reply Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. However, Mr. Hall reserves the
right to correct or clarify the State's recitation of the facts throughout this reply brief where
relevant.

ISSUES
1.

Whether The District Court Was Justified In Ordering A Second Conflict Inquiry Where
A Conflict Evaluation Had Already Been Conducted By An Independent Attorney Who
Found No Conflict, The Petitioner Did Not Raise A Conflict, And Neither The State Nor
The Court Can Identify Any Specific Facts That Would Either Undermine That
Determination Or Give Rise To A Conflict?

2.

Whether The District Court Violated The Separation Of Powers By Ordering The SAPD
To Pay For Services Already Provided Under The Statute Designating The Authority To
Provide Conflict Counsel Specifically To The SAPD Where There Is No Evidence The
SAPD Or Independent Counsel Failed To Satisfy Their Obligations?

3.

Whether The District Court Erred In Ordering The Disclosure Of Confidential And
Attorney Client Privileged Information In Furtherance Of An Unjustified Second Conflict
Inquiry?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Comi Erred In Ordering A Second Conflict Inquiry Where A Conflict Evaluation
Had Already Been Conducted By An Independent Attorney Who Found No Conflict, The
Petitioner Did Not Raise a Conflict, And Neither The State Nor The Court Can Identify Any
Facts That Would Either Undermine Those Determinations Or Give Rise To A Conflict
A.

Introduction
The State attempts to reframe the issue by asserting "the district court did not err by

conducting an inquiry into the existence of a possible conflict of interest that included the
appointment of independent conflict counsel to investigate the existence of a possible conflict of
interest." (Brief of Respondent (hereinafter Respondent's Brief), p.9.)

Mr. Hall never

categorically objected to the idea of the district comi conducting an inquiry of a potential conflict
of interest, and in fact, agrees with the comi's general duty to inquire. In addition, once the
district court ruled that an inquiry would be necessary, the SAPD suggested several possibilities
in order to satisfy the court's duty.

It also provided the court with an independent conflict

counsel-Mr. Benjamin-who had already investigated the possible conflict of interest.
The State contends in its Respondent's Brief that the question before this Court is not
whether an actual conflict exists, but "the nature of the inquiry the district court must undertake
to determine whether an actual conflict exists." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) In large part, Mr. Hall
agrees.

Mr. Hall does not wish to frame the issue as asking this Court to make a final

determination that no actual conflict exists, nor that the district court is not justified in requiring
an inquiry into a conflict of interest once it is raised by one of the parties. However, the primary
point lost in the State's framing of the issue is its failure to ask whether a second inquiry is
justified, where the resources available to the district court in the first inquiry were discounted,
ignored, and never exhausted.
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B.

The Nature Of The District Court's Conflict Inquiry
The SAPD contracted with Mr. Benjamin in order to conduct an evaluation of any

conflict with Mr. Hall in order to avoid delay and to avoid having its own evaluation of whether
a conflict existed being questioned or disputed by other parties involved. In addition, the SAPD
accepted the district comi's holding that an inquiry was necessary and suggested several
alternatives that would be acceptable. The SAPD also repeatedly encouraged the district court to
avail itself of Mr. Benjamin in conducting its inquiry.

The SAPD only objected to the

appointment of a second conflict counsel when it became clear Mr. Roark was to engage in the
exact same effort already completed by Mr. Benjamin, the SAPD would have to pay for the same
work a second time, and it was unclear whether Mr. Roark was being appointed as an
investigator for the Court or as counsel to Mr. Hall on the matter.
I. The SAPD Acted Out Of A Desire To A void Delay Or Undermine The Existing
Attorney-Client Relationship
The State argues in its Respondent's Brief that Mr. Benjamin's affidavit could not
alleviate the district court's concerns surrounding any possible conflict of interest because it
failed to discuss the nature of the communications between the SAPD and trial counsel.
(Respondent's Brief, p.17.)

In addition, the State notes that neither the SAPD's Amended

Notice, nor Mr. Benjamin's Affidavit explained "the genesis of the SAPD's concern." Id. As
was repeatedly explained to the district court, after noting the extent and nature of the contacts
between the SAPD and trial counsel, the SAPD filed its original Ex Parte Notice of Possible
Conflict oflnterest (hereinafter Ex Parte Notice) in order to avoid additional delay and to avoid
any potential to undermine the already existing attorney-client relationship with Mr. Hall.
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At the time the SAPD filed its original Ex Parte Notice, the office had just emerged from
a time-consuming conflict inquiry on another unrelated case, Abdullah v. State. From the very
beginning, it was apparent that the SAPD's decision to file a notice of possible conflict and to
contract with an outside attorney to conduct a conflict review was considerably influenced by the
SAPD's experience in the Abdullah case. (See Tr., p.332, Ls.16-25; see also R., pp.1350-51; R.,
pp.1396-98; R., pp.1462-63.) The discussion and evolution of the conflict inquiry repeatedly
referenced what had occurred in Abdullah. (See Tr., p.245, L.21 - p.246, L.19; Tr., p.290, L.21
p.291, L.10; Tr., p.318, L.17-p.319, L.18; Tr., p.320, Ls.15-21; Tr., p.327, Ls.12-20; Tr., p.359,
L.3

p.362, L.3.) In fact, the SAPD went so far as to submit to the district court a copy of

transcripts in the Abdullah case for guidance (R., pp.1354-64), and submitted a very lengthy
motion dedicated entirely to the history of that case, along with its Motion to Reconsider and the
Motion for Permission to Appeal. (See Motion for Court to Take Judicial Notice, R., pp.14851933.) The SAPD's Ex Parte Notice was filed out of an abundance of caution and represented an
attempt to avoid the costly delay experienced in Abdullah. 1 (See Tr., p.245, L.21 - p.246, L.19;
R., p.1398; R., pp.1462-63.) There was also considerable concern on the part of the SAPD as to
the possible detrimental affect its own evaluation of a conflict could have if that same evaluation
was later contradicted or undermined by another analysis or finding by the court. (R., pp.1398-99

1

In the Abdullah case, the post-conviction court inquired as to whether contacts between the
SAPD and trial counsel gave rise to any conflict, and counsel at the SAPD subsequently filed its
own representation that no conflict existed. (See R., p.1385; R., pp.1462-63.) After the SAPD
had made its own findings known to their client and the district court (and the State did not
disagree), the district court, nevertheless, entered a finding that a conflict did exist and that the
SAPD had a conflict in its representation of Mr. Abdullah. (See R., p.1385; R., pp.1462-63.)
The district court then appointed Mr. Roark as counsel to advise Abdullah on whether the
unidentified conflict should be waived. (See R., p.1385.) The conflict waiver was not finally
resolved until May 7, 2010 (R., pp.1445-53); and Mr. Hall's Ex Parte Notice was filed on June
29, 2010. (Appears as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record (see R., p.2043).)
5

("such a finding of a conflict, in direct opposition to the finding made by counsel could have a
significant impact on the attorney-client relationship and any existing relationship of trust"); R.,
p.1400 ("the SAPD did not want to advise Mr. Hall as to whether a conflict existed, only to have
that representation contradicted by another attorney or the Court, as happened in the Abdullah
case."); see also Tr., p.324, L.16 -- p.325, L.4.) In contrast to the State's characterization, the
SAPD filed its notice in an attempt to be candid and forthcoming with the court about its
undertaking a conflict review with outside conflict counsel. (See discussion at R., pp.13961401.)
2. SAPD Participation In Tbe Conflict Inquiry And Its Repeated Suggestions To Use
Mr. Benjamin As Paii Of The District Comi's Inquiry
Mr. Hall informed the district court at the first hearing after counsel had filed the Ex
Parte Notice, that the SAPD had contracted with Mr. Benjamin to advise Mr. Hall on whether

any conflict existed and had made all of its files available for his review and inspection. (R.,
pp.1299-1300; Tr., p.258, L.19 - p.259, L.4.) However, Mr. Hall also recognized the district
court had an independent duty to inquire where "a trial court knows or reasonably should know
that a particular conflict may exist." (R., p.1302, citing State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60
(2003).) Attorneys at the SAPD believed that affording Mr. Hall an opportunity to consult with
an outside attorney would allow him to take any necessary action in raising a conflict issue
without any interference from the SAPD. (R., p.1319.) As a result, the SAPD urged the district
court not to rule on whether a conflict inquiry should be ordered until the court could hear from
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Mr. Benjamin. 2 (R., p.1308; Tr., p.259, L.14 - p.260, L.2; Tr., p.283, L.12 - p.284, L.22.)
Without hearing from Mr. Benjamin, the district court instead granted the State's motion for a
conflict inquiry by the court. (See Tr., p.295, Ls.1-3.) The SAPD then repeatedly requested,
without objecting to the Court's order for a conflict inquiry, that the district court hear from
Mr. Benjamin regarding his evaluation of the conflict and the details surrounding any identified
potential conflict. 3

(See Tr., p.284, Ls.15-22; Tr., p.304, Ls.16-21; Tr., p.324, Ls.2-6; R.,

p.1308.) The State also repeatedly asked the district court to inquire of Mr. Benjamin. (Tr.,
p.307, L.22 - p.308, L.16; Tr., p.366, L.24 - p.367, L.21.) The district court admitted that
Mr. Benjamin had "gone a long way" in beginning a "searching and thorough" investigation,
(Tr., p.376, Ls.5-16) and at various times even suggested that it might be appropriate to hear
from Mr. Benjamin at an appropriate time. (See Tr., p.311, Ls.4-7; Tr., p.314, Ls.8-9; Tr., p.328,
Ls. 7-10.)
Unfortunately, beyond the affidavit Mr. Benjamin submitted on August 31, 2010, the
district court never heard from him regarding the conflict review or the facts surrounding his

2

The SAPD never argued that the district court was required to hear from Mr. Benjamin, or
accept his findings as part of any conflict inquiry. In fact, days before the district court granted a
conflict inquiry, Mr. Hall filed a notice suggesting three possible paths if a conflict inquiry were
deemed necessary, including (1) relying on the representations of Mr. Benjamin, (2) appointing
additional counsel at county expense, or (3) ordering a review of the materials by a different
district court judge. (See discussion at R., pp.1322-27.)
3
Mr. Hall did not suggest that the Court was obligated to hear from Mr. Benjamin or rely on his
representations. Instead Mr. Hall requested that the district court consider several factors in
determining the nature of the conflict inquiry, including "(1) the avoidance of additional and
unnecessary delays, (2) the conservation of limited County and State resources, (3) the protection
of the attorney-client privilege, and (4) a concerted effort to avoid creating any future or
unnecessary conflicts with the [district court.]" (R., p.1352.) Even then, Mr. Hall acknowledged
that relying on Mr. Benjamin was only the best of many options. (R., p.1349.) He suggested
that the district court consider Mr. Benjamin's evaluation and place his findings on the record to
the court's satisfaction. (R., pp.1349-50.) Nevertheless, Mr. Hall continued to concede the
Court's power to appoint another attorney, at county expense, amongst other options. (R.,
pp.1350-52.)
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investigation. In fact, the district court characterized Mr. Benjamin as less than forthcoming.
"The [district court] has given both the SAPD and Mr. Benjamin several opportunities to come
forward voluntarily with the details of the communications between the SAPD and Hall II trial
counsel. In each instance, counsel has chosen not to voluntarily disclose the details of those
communications." (R., p.1375.) That characterization is not true. Mr. Benjamin was never given
an opportunity in court or on the record to answer any questions that the district court may have
had to satisfy its obligation to inquire into the possibility of a conflict. In fact, as was already
mentioned, the district court refused to hear from Mr. Benjamin when offered by the SAPD or
the State.
In its Respondent's

Brief~

the State acknowledges that the district court is required to do

more, noting that "when presented with a possible conflict of interest claim, 'at a minimum the
trial court should have requested that [counsel] give him some idea of what the conflict entailed
to allow him to determine whether to order [counsel] to withdraw." (Respondent's Brief, pp.2021, citing United States v. DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 1985).) In the words of the
State, "the mere reading of a file and colloquy with defense counsel may not be sufficient
inquiry." (Respondent's Brief, p.20.) Here, the mere reading of Mr. Benjamin's affidavit was an
insufficient inquiry under Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), or Hamilton v. Ford, 969
F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1992).
a. The Independent Nature Of Mr. Benjamin's Representation
The State notes in its Respondent's Brief that Mr. Hall's attorneys at the SAPD had
acknowledged that "the Court is very unlikely to be satisfied with current Counsel's
representations" and that "neither the court nor the State should necessarily be satisfied with
representations made by the SAPD as to the nature of any potential conflict." (Respondent's
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Brief: p.4.) It should be clear from the context of the transcript that Mr. Hall's counsel was
referring to the representations of attorneys at the SAPD office, and not those representations
made by Mr. Benjamin. (See Tr., p.259, L.14 - p.261, L.5.) In fact, the SAPD was requesting
that the district court hear from Mr. Benjamin in the place of attorneys from the SAPD. Id. The
State mentions that attorneys at the SAPD had initially agreed with the district court's assertion
that the Court would not be bound by the views of Mr. Benjamin, and then took a contrary
position in its subsequent filing, stating that "representations made by Mr. Benjamin, as
independent conflict counsel, should not suffer the same skepticism and would certainly allow
the Court to rely on his representations." (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) However, such a position
did not contradict what the SAPD attorneys had previously said in court, and in fact was a direct
response to the State's assertion that "this Court cannot rely upon Mr. Benjamin's independent
review." (See R., p.1320.) The SAPD's consistent position was that although the district court
was not bound by Mr. Benjamin's representations, it should consider them, give them
appropriate weight, and could rely on them in conducting its own inquiry. (See R., pp.1302-03,
1320, 1323-25, 1336, 1349-50.)
Mr. Benjamin was contracted by the SAPD as "counsel to Mr. Hall" and not as counsel to
advise the SAPD. (Tr., p.307, Ls.2-4; Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin (Filed Under Seal), filed
August 31, 20104 (hereinafter Benjamin Affidavit), if5.) The SAPD gave Mr. Benjamin full
access to attorney and client files regarding Mr. Hall's cases, and all communications with "Hall
II" trial counsel. (Tr., p.307, Ls.4-5; Benjamin Affidavit, ifi15,7.) Other than providing access to
Mr. Benjamin, there were no further communications with Mr. Benjamin regarding his findings
or advice to Mr. Hall prior to his submitting his affidavit. (See Tr., p.283, Ls.16-18; Benjamin

4

Appears as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. (See R., p.2043.)
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Affidavit, "if5.) Mr. Benjamin undertook an exhaustive investigation of the period of overlapping
representation and met with Mr. Hall.

(Benjamin Affidavit,

~~5,7.)

There is no evidence

Mr. Benjamin's representation of Mr. Hall on the conflict issue was compromised in any way.
b. SAPD Cooperation And Willingness To Share Additional Information With
The District Court
The State also suggests that the SAPD resisted the district court's order to file an
amended notice, specifying and explaining the nature of the contacts between the SAPD
attorneys and trial counsel. (Respondent's Brief, p.5.) The SAPD objected primarily because it
believed that it no longer represented Mr. Hall on the limited issue of whether or not there was a
conflict of interest and that the district court should direct such an inquiry at Mr. Benjamin. (See
Tr., p.317, L.20 - p.319, L.2; p.324, L.2 - p.325, L.10; p.327, L.21 - p.328, L.6.) The SAPD
also expressed some reservation that to reveal additional inforn1ation might require a disclosure
of privileged information. (See Tr., p.329, L.14 - p.330, L.18.) The SAPD even expressed
frnstration that the district court was requiring the SAPD to file an amended notice instead of
requesting the same information from Mr. Benjamin. (Tr., p.330, Ls.7-15.) The district court
requested that the amended filing include "something more specific" (Tr., p.311, L.6), and asked
for "some benchmarks, about what it is that-that caused your office to file this notice." (Tr.,
p.328, Ls.8-10.) The district court indicated that it was "not looking for specific advice given,
just whether advice was given." (Tr., p.313, Ls.11-12.)
Without further objection, the SAPD did file an Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of
Interest. (R., pp.1336-40.)

In that notice, the SAPD disclosed the extent of communication

between SAPD attorneys and trial counsel over the course of several months; noted that there
had been at least two meetings between the attorneys, and indicated additional contacts with
SAPD staff in order to facilitate the sharing of testing and expert information. (R., p.1338.) The
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SAPD also indicated that the "content and nature of those communications have already been
made available to the State by providing complete access to trial counsels' files" and that any
disclosure as to the specific content of the communications should be addressed to
Mr. Benjamin. Id. The next day, Mr. Benjamin filed a Limited Notice of Appearance "as to the
conflict interest issue only" along with an affidavit filed under seal. (See R., pp.1341-44.) In that
affidavit, Mr. Benjamin explained the extent and nature of his review, and his specific findings
regarding whether any advice had been given by the SAPD attorneys to Mr. Hall's trial
attorneys. (Benjamin Affidavit,

~iJI0-12.)

It should be noted that the district court never found

Mr. Benjamin to be conflicted in his representation of Mr. Hall, and has never removed
Mr. Benjamin or relieved him of his Limited Notice of Appearance.
3. Mr. Hall Objects To The District Court's Order Appointing Mr. Roark, Which
Requires Him To Render The Same Services Provided By Mr. Benjamin
a. Mr. Benjamin Has Already Performed The Same Work Now Required Of
Mr. Roark
The State mentions m its Respondent's Brief that the district court issued its
Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict Counsel
(hereinafter Order) due to the "vague and conclusory nature of the SAPD and Benjamin's

pleadings" and that the court is "lacking the factual background necessary to reach any
conclusion" regarding the existence of a conflict. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) Consequently, the
district court appointed Mr. Roark and tasked him with conducting a conflict inquiry. As part of
that order, the district court requested that Mr. Roark first "conduct a thorough and searching
review of the SAPD's pre-trial, trial and pre-sentence involvement in the trial of Hall II (R.,
p.1375), and then report the following, "(1) whether a conflict exists; (2) if so, the general nature
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of the conflict; (3) the facts surrounding or underlying the conflict; and (4) whether independent
counsel believes that such conflict may be imputed to the entire SAPD's office." (R., p.1376.)
This is a perfect description of what Mr. Benjamin undertook and perfonned for Mr. Hall
after contracting with the SAPD. In fact, it appears that the district court constructed its order to
mirror the contents of Mr. Benjamin's own affidavit because Mr. Benjamin clearly outlined these
same efforts and conclusions in his affidavit. The scope of Mr. Benjamin's representation of
Mr. Hall was the same as proposed for Mr. Roark in that he had been contracted by the SAPD to
detennine whether there was a conflict in representing Mr. Hall. (Benjamin Afii.davit,

irs.)

Second, Mr. Benjamin conducted an extensive review of the case by conducting seven
interviews with parties involved, reviewing all emails sent or received by trial counsel, reviewing
SAPD attorney notes and internal correspondence, and SAPD correspondence with trial counsel,
along with the post-conviction petitions on both of Mr. Hall's matters. (Benjamin Affidavit,

~7.)

His affidavit also included responses to the same four requests the district court asked to be
included in Mr. Roark's report to the court. First, his affidavit indicated that he did not believe a
conflict existed and included an explanation as to why. (Benjamin Affidavit, ififl 0-13.) Second,
with respect to the "nature of the conflict," he referenced an instance in which advice was given
by SAPD attorneys to trial counsel. (Benjamin Affidavit, ifl2.) Third, because Mr. Benjamin
made a determination that no conflict existed, it did not include detailed facts surrounding the
advice that was given, but included an explanation that the advice was favorable to Mr. Hall and
did not relate to any claim in Mr. Hall's post-conviction petitions. (Id). Finally, the affidavit
includes Mr. Benjamin's opinion that, even if the facts were to constitute a conflict of interest, it
could not be imputed to the entire SAPD office. (Benjamin Affidavit, if13.)
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It is important to note that the district court's order does not require Mr. Roark to report

on the facts of the case should he determine a conflict does not exist.

Such an omission is

telling, in light of the fact the district court indicates that its duty to inquire further is the result of
counsels' lack of disclosure of specific facts surrounding the potential conflict. (R., p.13 75, Ls.13; p.1373, L.24 - p.1374, L.2.) Here, Mr. Benjamin has already determined that no conflict
exists, and consequently conclusion is that no conflict exists. (See, Benjamin Affidavit,

~l 0.)

ff

Mr. Roark were to reach the same conclusion in his report, one assumes that there would be no
need to further elaborate on the facts since the district court's order is conditional on his finding
a conflict.
b. Mr. Benjamin Was Not Exhausted As A Resource By The District Court
The district court never exhausted or utilized the work already perfonned by
Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Benjamin appeared in court three times to represent Mr. Hall before the
district court judge on the conflict issue.

(Tr., p.282, L.24; Tr., p.335, Ls.17-19; Tr., p.348,

Ls.17-18.) At no time did the district court inquire of Mr. Benjamin as to the content of his
conflict review or his findings. However, the court repeatedly stated that Mr. Benjamin was not
the district court's choice to conduct any conflict review and would not have been its choice had
the SAPD consulted with the court before contracting with him. (Tr., p.257, Ls.8-9 ("he is not
the Court's selection in this case"; Tr., p.268, Ls.11-15 ("the fact that you've called him
independent doesn't mean that he's been appointed by the Court, or that I would be persuaded");

R., p.13 77 ("he is not this Court's choice of independent counsel and would not have been this
Court's choice of independent counsel had the SAPD consulted with the Court before choosing
him.").) The district court clearly expressed its displeasure that Mr. Benjamin had been engaged
to conduct a conflict review by the SAPD without first consulting the court.
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The only significant difference between the evaluation already conducted by
Mr. Benjamin and the inquiry to be conducted by Mr. Roark, appears to be the court's
authorization of Mr. Roark to conduct depositions, if necessary. (R., p.1376.) However, the
SAPD did request in its Motion to Reconsider that the district court inquire of Mr. Benjamin as
to whether he would like to depose any witnesses. (R., p.1409.) The district court declined to
inquire any further of Mr. Benjamin.
c. The District Court's Use Of Mr. Benjamin Represents No More Of An
Abdication Of The Court's Duty To Inquire Than Would The Use Of
Mr. Roark To Assist The Court In A Similar Way
Every case that the State cites in its Respondent's Brief deals with the district court's own
"independent duty to conduct its own thorough and searching inquiry regarding the possibility of
a conflict of interest" in that they involve conflict inquiries undertaken by the trial court. (See
Respondent's Briet: p.22.) However, the instant case presents a clear case where the district
court has opted to abdicate that investigation and evaluation to a third-party attorney, Mr. Roark,
who will report those findings back to the district court in order to make the final determination
of whether a conflict exists. (See R., pp.1375-76.) The State even admits that "the court's duty to
conduct a 'thorough and searching' inquiry cannot be abrogated and given to an attorney retained
by the very entity that may have precipitated the alleged conflict' it is the court's inquiry, not
counsel's or someone chosen by counsel." (Respondent's Brief, p. 18.) And yet, in the same
breath, the State argues that it is permissible for the district court to "give" the inquiry to another
attorney to perform, in this case, Mr. Roark. If it is, as the State argues, "the court's inquiry,"
Mr. Roark's assistance should face the same problem as does that of Mr. Benjamin.
The State argues that the district court's duty '"to conduct a thorough and searching
inquiry would [not] be satisfied in this case by simply accepting the opinions of counsel
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regarding whether a conflict exists without any disclosure of the factual basis for that opinion'
because the court 'is presently lacking the factual background necessary to reach any
conclusion."' (Respondent's Brief: pp.22-23.)

However, given the structure of the district

court's order and what information it has requested be included in Mr. Roark's report, that is
precisely what the district court appears to be willing to do as long as the report comes from an
attorney of its own choosing.
C.

Conclusion
Given the fact that the appointment of Mr. Roark appears to duplicate precisely the same

evaluation already conducted by Mr. Benjamin, the district court's conflict inquiry should have
exhausted the offering of current conflict counsel before appointing a second conflict counsel.
Such an appointment would constitute a second full inquiry by the district court.

Where an

independent attorney has already conducted a conflict evaluation, has made the determination
that no conflict exists, and the defendant has chosen not to seek new counsel as a result, the
district court elTed in appointing Mr. Roark.
II.

The District Court Exceeded Its Authority And Violated The Separation Of Powers By Ordering
the SAPD To Pay For Services Already Provided Under the Statute Designating The Authority
To Provide Conflict Counsel Specifically To The SAPD, Where There Is No Evidence The
SAPD Or Independent Counsel Failed To Satisfy Their Obligations
A.

Introduction
The State makes two arguments why Mr. Hall should be denied relief under this claim.

First, that Mr. Hall has waived his separation of powers argument on appeal. However, because
this is a permissive interlocutory appeal, Mr. Hall has not waived his separation of powers
argument, and the issue for consideration is whether this Court should consider the claim now or
later during his consolidated direct and post-conviction appeal after perfecting his claim in
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district court. Mr. Hall also asserts the district court has already heard the sum and substance of
Mr. Hall's claim that the court exceeds its jurisdiction by forcing a department of the executive
branch to pay for duplicate services already provided.

The State's second argument is that

LC. § 19-871 "merely requires the SAPD to pay for the services of conflict counsel and does not
prohibit the district court from making an appropriate appointment." Mr. Hall contends that the
SAPD has already paid for the services of conflict counsel in Mr. Benjamin, and that any forced
payment of additional conflict counsel represents overreaching by the district court.
B.

Mr. Hall's Waiver Of A Separation Of Powers Argument
The State cites several cases to represent the notion that constitutional issues will not be

considered when raised for the first time on appeal. However, none of the cases cited by the
State involved a permissive appeal, but instead represent cases on appeal from a final judgment.
See State v. Ransom, 137 Idaho 560, 563 (Ct. App. 2002) (on direct appeal from a judgment of

conviction and sentence for voluntary manslaughter); State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 193 (1991)
(on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence for lewd conduct with a minor);
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645 (Ct. App. 1997) (on direct appeal from conviction and

sentence for possession of a controlled substance); State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578 (1991)
(on State's appeal from a withheld judgment granted by the district court at sentencing); State v.
Mauro, 121 Idaho 178 (1991) (on appeal from a Court of Appeals decision to reverse the district

court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho
450, 451 (Ct. App. 1997) (on direct appeal from a conviction and sentence for arson); and State
v. Hardman, 120 Idaho 667, 668 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appeal of a district court's affirmation of a

magistrate court's judgment of conviction for obstruction and failure to produce insurance).
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If this Comt were to declare the separation of powers claim as waived and refuse to

address Mr. Hall's claim on the merits, the very purpose and nature of the permissive appeal
would be undermined. This Court grants permission for an interlocutory appeal where there is a
"controlling question of law" as to which there are "substantial grounds for difference of
opinion" and where allowing an immediate appeal "may materially advance the orderly
resolution of the litigation." LA.R. 12(a). This Court has interpreted Rule 12 in light of its intent
"to provide an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great
public interest or legal questions of first impression are involved." Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,
3-4 (1983).
Mr. Hall challenged the district court's jurisdiction in light of a separation of powers
framework when he filed his first Motion for Permission to Appeal (hereinafter Motion) with
this Court on February 11, 2011. He stated his proposed Issues for Appeal, and included it as an
enumerated issue: "(3) whether the district court violates the separation of powers by forcing the
SAPD to pay for services already provided under the statute designating the authority to provide
conflict counsel specifically to the SAPD." (Motion, p.11.) He included a lengthy discussion at
that time of the proposed issue and why it presented a controlling question of law appropriate for
an interlocutory appeal. (See Motion, section III(C), pp.18-20.) Although the State did not have
the benefit of the entire record when it constructed its Response to Petitioner's Motion for
Permission to Appeal, it had seen the various appendices attached to Mr. Hall's Motion, which
included several notices, affidavits, a motion, and the Court's original Order, issued on
December 27, 2010 (Motion, Appendices A-F).) At that time, the State made no objection to the
issues as framed by Mr. Hall given the nature of the district court's order. Both of Mr. Hall's
Notices of Appeal, filed on April 13, 2011 and June 14, 2011, clearly included a violation of the
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separation of powers as an issue he intended to raise on appeal. (See Notice of Appeal, filed
April 13, 2011, iJ3(d); Notice of Appeal, filed June 14, 2011, iJ3(d).)
If the Co mi were to agree that Mr. Hall's claim that Idaho's constitutional prov1s1on

laying forth the separation of powers is violated simply because there was an omission of citation

in the district court, given the current procedural posture of the case there is nothing that would
prevent Mr. Hall from simply making the same argument under the label of a "separation of
powers" label when his post-conviction resumes.

In that event, the benefit and purpose of a

permissive appeal will have been wasted, simply leaving the issue to be addressed later during
the appeal of his post-conviction case. 5
It also bears mentioning that even in the absence of a citation to article II, section 1 of the

Idaho Constitution, the district court was well aware of the sum and substance of the arguments
being advanced by Mr. Hall in light of the court's jurisdiction and the executive authority and
mandate given to the SAPD concerning the arrangement and payment of conflict counsel for
SAPD clients. If it was not perfectly clear on December 27, 2010, when the district court issued
its Order, those arguments had been fully fleshed out in Mr. Hall's Motion to Reconsider
Memorandum Decision and Order, filed on January 10, 2011 (R., pp.1379-1460), and his Motion
for Permission to Appeal, filed the same day (R., pp.1461-84).

5

In his Motion, Mr. Hall

If this Court were to detennine that it could not reach the separation of powers claim because
post-conviction counsel had never cited article II, section I of the Idaho Constitution, Mr. Hall
would respectfully suggest that the Court exercise its power under I.A.R. I 3.3(a) in order to
obtain a ruling from the district court on its orders in light of a clear objection under article II,
section I. ("At any time before the issuance of an opinion, the Supreme Court may on its own
motion, or on motion of any party showing good cause, order a case to be remanded to the
district court ... to take further action as designated in the order of remand.") A temporary
remand would allow this Court the opportunity to address the claim on its merits at this stage and
to avoid the same issue being raised later on appeal from the final judgment of the postconviction action.
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incorporated the "arguments and caselaw contained in his Motion for Permission to Appeal." (R.,
p.1379.) In his Motion for Permission to Appeal, Mr. Hall discussed at some length the nature of
the district court's order in light of the SAPD's statutory authority and obligation, and the fact
that the court's order exceeded its jurisdiction in light of the cited state statutes. (See R., pp.147279.) After considering Mr. Hall's Motion and Motion for Permission to Appeal, the district court
issued its subsequent orders denying both on February 23, 2011, and March 4, 2011 (R.,
pp.1965-74, 1975-88.)
Although Mr. Hall frames the argument in his Brief as a violation of Idaho Constitution
article II, section l, the essence of his argument is grounded in other portions of the Idaho
Constitution and several statutes delineating the SAPD function, the extent of the district court's
jurisdiction and its ability to appoint counsel, and the county's responsibility for such payments.

(See Appellant's Brief, section II, pp.16-25.) With the exception of article II, section 1, each of
the sections and statutes argued in Mr. Hall's appellate brief had been presented to the district
court for consideration:

IDAHO CONST. art. VII, § 13 (see R., pp.1408-09) (regarding

appropriations made by the legislature); IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 18 (see R., p.1476) (regarding
constitutional prohibition of claims made against the State without the approval of the Board of
Examiners); the argument that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in defeating the
legislative intent in creating the SAPD and the capital crimes defense fund (see R., p.1477);
LC.§ 19-860 (see R., pp.1325-26, 1407-08, 1478-79) (regarding the county's responsibility to
pay for direct expenses necessary to indigent representation); LC. § 19-863(A) (see R., p.1474)
(regarding the establishment of the capital crimes defense fund); LC.§ 19-868 (see R., p.1474)
(regarding the creation of the state appellate public defender); LC.§ 19-869 (see R., pp.1474-75)
(establishing the SAPD as a branch of the executive); LC. § 19-870 (see R., p.1474) (regarding
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the scope of representation and duties of the SAPD, and its ability to contract and provide
representation to clients); I.C. § 19-871 (see R., p.1323-26, 1389-90, 1399, 1407, 1477-78 )
(regarding the SAPD's obligation to arrange for the payment of conflict counsel); I.C. § 19-4904
(see R., p.1325) (regarding the county's responsibility to bear the cost of expenses in post-

conviction cases.) Given the record and the various arguments that were made before the district
court, Mr. Hall's failure to note article II, section I, was merely a citation oversight and does not
mean that the district court never had the opportunity to address the claim Mr. Hall has made in
the instant appeal.
C.

The District Court's Order Requires The SAPD To Pay For Services Already Rendered,
Which Is In Excess Of Its Jurisdiction And Beyond The Statutory Obligations fmposed
On The SAPD
The State acknowledges in its Respondent's Brief that under LC.§ 19-870(3), the SAPD

has the authority to "contract with private attorneys to provide representation on a case-by-case
basis when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources." (Respondent's Brief, p.25.)
However, it argues in the same breath that I.C. § 19-871 "does not require nor even permit the
SAPD to 'arrange' for the appointment of conflict counsel when there is 'a conflict of counsel or
any other reason,' but only for the compensation of conflict counsel." Id. Read in combination,
the State is arguing that the effect of sections 19-870(3) and 19-871 is that the SAPD can
contract with a private attorney only where doing so "would conserve budgetary resources" and
not for any other reason, including where there might be a conflict. If the Court were to adopt

such a position, the SAPD would be required to submit every conflict case to the Supreme Court
or a lower district court for appointment of conflict counsel, unless it could prove that its own
contracting authority would "conserve budgetary resources." Such a reading of the two statues
in question, in isolation of one another, would effectively prevent the SAPD from contracting
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with private attorneys without court approval. Such a reading would render the authority granted
to the SAPD by the legislature under section 19-870(3) almost meaningless. It should not be
forgotten, in any event, that Mr. Hall's primary objection to the appointment of Mr. Roark is
rooted in a desire to conserve the budgetary resources referenced in section 19-870(3).
The interpretation of the relevant statutes must also consider the unique nature of a state
public defender office. In this respect it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court
has determined that states have a "constitutional obligation to respect the professional
independence of the public defenders whom it engages." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
321-22 ( 1981 ). The Supreme Comi observed that "a defense lawyer best serves the public, not
by acting on the State's behalf or in concert with it, but rather by advancing 'the undivided
interests of the client.' This is essentially a private function ... for which state office and
authority are not needed." Id. at 318-19. In commenting on the institutional role of a public
defender, the Supreme Court concluded that a
public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as
other employees of the State. Administrative and legislative decisions
undoubtedly influence the way a public defender does his work. State decisions
may determine the quality of his law library or the size of his caseload. But a
defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of
an administrative superior.

Id. at 321.
National standards of justice also reflect the aims set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Polk County, to the extent that the American Bar Association's Ten Principles of a

Public Defense Delivery System explicitly states that
The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of the
defense counsel, is independent. The public defense function should be
independent from political influence and subject to judicial supervision only in
the same manner and to the same extent as retained counsel . . . Removing
oversight from the judiciary ensures judicial independence from undue political
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pressures and is an important means of furthering the independence of public
defense.
ABA Standing Committee On Legal Aid And Indigent Defendants (Feb. 2002),

ill, p.2. 6

Similar

principles have been mirrored in numerous other publications, standards, and model statutes. 7
As a result, the Court should be reluctant to endorse judicial meddling in the function of the
SAPD where the SAPD has undertaken adequate steps to satisfy its statutory obligations and
provide its clients with independent and uncompromised legal advice.
The State argues in its Respondent's Brief that the district court has an obligation under
I.C.R. 44.2(1) and I.C.R. 44.3 to ensure that the appointment of post-conviction counsel satisfies
the standards and requirements for capital cases. (Respondent's Brief, p.27.) Furthem10re, if the
district comi were to find that the SAPD or any other appointed attorney did not meet
requirement under the rules for capital representation, the district court has the "authority to
appoint counsel that is qualified and order that attorney be compensated out of the SAPD's
budget." Id. However, there was never any such finding in this case, and neither the State nor
the district court ever challenged or questioned Mr. Benjamin's qualifications to handle capital
post-conviction cases. The State goes even further in its argument and advances the proposition
that where the SAPD is unable to carry out its duty "for any other reason" under I. C. § 19-871,

6

Available online at http://ivww.americanhar.org/contentldam/abaladministrativellegal aid
indigent defendants/ls sclaid de{ tenprincipleshooklet.authcheckdam.pdf
7
See National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force on
Courts, Chapter 13, The Defense (1973), Standards 13.8, 13.9; National Study Commission on
Defense Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the United States (1976), Guidelines
2.8, 2.18, 5.13; American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense
Services (3rd ed. 1992), Standards 5-1.3, 5-1.6, 5-4.1; Standards for the Administration of
Assigned Counsel Systems (NLADA 1989), Standard 2.2; NLADA Guidelines for Negotiating
and Awarding Contracts for Criminal Defense Services, (1984), Guidelines II-1, 2; and National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Model Public Defender Act (1970),
§ lO(d).
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the district court has the same authority to appoint counsel and force the SAPD to pay for it. Id.
Such a position only begs the question whether the court or the SAPD determines what reasons
would disqualify the SAPD beyond an actual conflict of interest. It also ignores the fact that
such a preliminary determination by the SAPD was the very reason they engaged an outside
conflict attorney to evaluate and advise Mr. Hall on any potential conflict of interest. (See R.,
p.1319; Tr., p.306, Ls.23-25.)
The State further argues in its Respondent's Brief that because the district court has an
independent duty to conduct an inquiry and determine the procedure to be utilized, it is simply
irrelevant that the SAPD had already contracted with Mr. Benjamin, particularly where the court
found his inquiry was insufficient.

(Respondent's Brief, p.27)

Mr. Hall has recognized the

power of the Court to appoint another attorney in furtherance of its inquiry. (R., p.1351.) The
SAPD has even reluctantly suggested such an appointment as a possible course of action. (R.,
pp.1322, 1351.) It makes no sense, however, to find that the SAPD's efforts to provide Mr. Hall
with conflict counsel should not be considered by the court when determining whether to appoint
additional counsel and who should pay for such an appointment. As already noted, the district
court has ordered the SAPD to pay for the services of another attorney simply because the
district court would not have chosen Mr. Benjamin had he been given the opportunity to select
counsel. (See discussion at I(B)(3)(b ), supra.) It has already been argued that Mr. Roark's
investigation would be a duplication of Mr. Benjamin's efforts. (See discussion at I(B)(3)(a),
supra.) The district court certainly has the prerogative to ask for duplicative work, and doing so
would not necessarily constitute an abuse of discretion. However, if the district court wishes to
duplicate efforts, without offering a reason as to why Mr. Benjamin would not qualify as
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adequate capital counsel, why his representation is compromised, 8 or why the court is unwilling
to fully avail itself of Mr. Benjamin's ongoing representation in conducting its inquiry, then the
court appears to be engaging the assistance of Mr. Roark for its own convenience. Mr. Hall
argues that such an engagement should be at the district court's expense. (See R., pp.1376-77.)
The SAPD's obligation to "arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be
compensated out of the budget of the state appellate public defender[,]" is triggered under
LC.§ 19-871 by the SAPD's inability to carry out its duties. Absent the inability of the SAPD to

carry out its duties because of a conflict or some other reason, the SAPD has no obligation to pay
for new counsel. Here, the order requiring the SAPD to pay for a conflict inquiry to be conducted
by an attorney of the district court's choosing, after having already paid for a similar service, is
premised on the district court's erroneous conclusion that the SAPD is either unable to carry out
its duties or has failed to satisfy its obligations under the statute. Because there has been a
detennination by independent conflict counsel that no conflict of interest exists and the district
court has failed to identify one, the SAPD' s duty to arrange and pay for conflict counsel to
represent Mr. Hall during a conflict inquiry has already been satisfied under LC. § 19-871.
D.

Conclusion
Absent the inability of the SAPD to carry out its duties because of a conflict or some

other reason, the SAPD has no obligation, or ability, to pay for additional counsel. Here, the
order requiring the SAPD to pay for a second conflict inquiry to be conducted by an attorney of

8

The district court does mention that Mr. Benjamin has an ongoing business relationship with
the SAPD as designated conflict counsel. (See R., p.1378, "Mr. Benjamin was chosen by the
same office that is potentially conflicted in this matter, and did not have the authority to depose.
He is closely aligned with the SAPD in that he regularly acts as conflict counsel for the SAPD
and therefore, a portion of his income is dependent to some degree upon his relationship with
that office.") However, that mere fact would disqualify all contracted conflict counsel for the
very same reason.
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the district court's choosing, after having already paid for a similar service, is premised on the
district court's erroneous conclusion that the SAPD is either unable to carry out its duties or has
failed to satisfy its obligations under the statute. Pursuant to I. C. § 19-871, no detennination was
made by the SAPD that it was unable to cmTy out the duties required in the Act subsequent to
Mr. Benjamin's review, nor that the SAPD or Mr. Benjamin suffer from any actual conflict of
interest. The district court should then be obligated to conduct its conflict inquiry utilizing the
cooperation and advice of cmTent conflict counsel, Mr. Benjamin, or engage another attorney at
its own expense. Consequently, any attempt by the court to appoint a second conflict counsel at
the expense of the SAPD, circumvents the legislative purpose and intent in establishing a state
appellate public defender office, and exceeds the district court's jurisdiction insofar as it
represents an unjustifiable intrusion by the judiciary into an executive function.
III.

The District Court Erred In Ordering The Disclosure Of Confidential And Attorney-Client
Privileged Information In Furtherance Of An Unjustified Second Conflict Inqui1y

A.

Introduction
The State argues that Mr. Hall should be prevented from "using the privilege as both a

shield and a sword." (Respondent's Brief, p.35.) By way of elaboration, the State argues that
Mr. Hall "is unwilling to provide the district court with the info1mation necessary to conduct the
thorough and searching inquiry mandated by the United States Supreme Court and Idaho
Supreme Court." (Respondent's Brief, p.35.) Such is not the case. Mr. Hall argues that his
attorneys at the SAPD have been forthcoming about the possibility of a conflict of interest, and
the information sought by the district court is largely available from other sources without having
to pierce an existing privilege.
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B.

Mr. Hall's Alleged Attempt To Use Attorney-Client Privilege As A Sword And A Shield
Mr.

Hall

acknowledges his

attorneys

arc

permitted to

breach attorney-client

confidentiality in releasing infonnation pursuant to a court order to do so. "A lawyer may be
ordered to reveal infonnation relating to the representation of a client by a court ... to compel the
disclosure." IRPC 1.6, Comment

if13.

However, the Rules of Professional Conduct do not

permit immediate capitulation, but instead require that "absent informed consent of the client to
do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the
order is not authorized by other law or that the infonnation sought is protected against disclosure
by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law." Id. Mr. Hall's litigation surrounding
the district court's orders appointing Mr. Roark, including this pennissive appeal, represents
such an effort. "In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client about
the possibility of appeal to the extent required by Rule 1.4." Id. The district court's Order and
Supplemental Order constitute the adverse ruling contemplated in the Commentary to Rule 1.6.

Mr. Hall suggests the district court's order requiring disclosure of client files is wholly
unnecessary, because there are other ways for the court to accomplish its purposes without
violating the privilege and confidentiality of the SAPD.
It is unnecessary to waive privilege and confidentiality with the SAPD or Mr. Benjamin,

and order the complete disclosure of files for the court's review, in order to discover the nature
of conversations between the SAPD attorneys and trial counsel, precisely because the district
court has already waived the attorney-client privilege regarding Mr. Chastain and Mr. Kristal.
(See R., pp.1250-51.) In fact, the State reminded the district court, that to the extent there had

already been a waiver of attorney-client privilege with Mr. Chastain and Ms. Kristal, the State
should be entitled to that information. (Tr., p.245, Ls.9-15.)
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Although Hall II trial counsel could probably answer many of the questions without
implicating any privilege issues, the district court ordered the State to not contact trial counsel in
Hall II regarding the contacts in question. (R., p.13 77.)

Although the SAPD asserted an

attorney-client privilege and confidential relationship exists between the SAPD and Mr. Hall, the
SAPD repeatedly suggested that if the district court or State wished to discover the content of
communications between the SAPD and Hall II trial counsel, that Mr. Hall's attorney-client
privilege had been waived with respect to his trial counsel. (See R., p.1320; R., p.1338; R.,
pp.1412-13.)

Since his trial counsel, Rob Chastain and Deborah Kristal, were available for

inquiry, it is a mystery why the district court prohibited the State from contacting Mr. Chastain
and Ms. Kristal about any contacts they may have had with the SAPD leading up to the Hall II
trial, which could provide the factual infonnation the court believes it is lacking. The district
court gave no explanation as to the reasoning for its order barring contact with trial counsel. (See
R., p.1377.)
As previously noted, the district court has largely abdicated its role in conducting for
itself a searching inquiry into the possibility of a conflict by appointing Mr. Roark to perfonn the
inquiry and submit a report as to its findings. (See discussion at I(B)(3)(c), supra.) However, in
its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that the district court is entitled to privileged and
confidential information and files for an in camera review. (Respondent's Brief, p. 32.) Mr. Hall
had previously urged the district court to consider a separate judge to consider those materials in
order to avoid a possible disqualification of a post-conviction judge where the same judge is
tasked with future rulings and findings of fact. (See R., 1326-27.) Because of the nature of the
inquiry ordered by the district court, where the court has not yet contemplated a personal review
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of those communications and documents, no motion for a separate judge to conduct that review
was ever filed.
C.

Conclusion
The SAPD immediately disclosed a potential conflict when it became aware of the

possibility of a conflict of interest in their representation of Mr. Hall. In addition, Mr. Hall had
already signed one waiver of confidentiality and privilege in order for Mr. Benjamin to review
all of the SAP D's materials related to its representation of Mr. Hall.

Furthennore, because the

contacts in question occurred between the SAPD and trial counsel, the fact that trial counsel and
their files have been made available to the State would allow the district court or the State to
review those contacts and even conduct an inquiry with trial counsel limited to a conflict inquiry,
without needing to pierce additional privilege. As a result, any order requiring current counsel to
release additional files and answer questions regarding the conflict, is unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Because Mr. Benjamin has already performed the conflict evaluation sought by the
district court, its orders appointing Mr. Roark are duplicative and unnecessary.

Even if

Mr. Roark were to satisfy the district court's order, the district court would be in no better
position to evaluate the presence of an actual conflict than it would be upon further inquiry of
Mr. Benjamin. In addition, it is a violation of the separation of powers for the district court to
insert itself into the management and budget of an executive agency like the SAPD, where every
indication is that the agency has satisfied both its statutory mandate and its ethical obligation to
its client. Furthennore, the documents ordered to be released are protected by attorney-client
privilege and the rule of confidentiality. For these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully asks this Court
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to vacate the district court's orders appointing Mr. Roark to conduct a second conflict inquiry
and remand this case for completion of post-conviction proceedings.
DATED this 30111 day of October, 2012.
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